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Abstract: The framework proposed by Crump et al. still leaves much doubt about whether
invertebrates such as crabs are sentient. For example, many complex behaviours - even in
humans - occur without sentience. Also, simple machines could easily meet all of Crump et
al.’s eight proposed criteria for sentience. Acknowledging the limitations of what we currently
know about sentience is important both for formulating legislation correctly and for advancing
scientific understanding of this most puzzling of biological phenomena.
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The question of which non-human animals are sentient can currently, depending on which
authors are cited, be given almost every possible answer from none (MacPhail, 1987), to only
apes (Bermond, 2001), to all mammals (Boly et al., 2013), to mammals and birds (Seth et al.,
2005), to mammals, birds and reptiles but not fish or amphibia (Cabanac et al., 2009), to all
vertebrates including fish (Denton et al., 2009; Mashour and Alkire, 2013; Braithwaite, 2010;
Sneddon, 2019) to all vertebrates and a few invertebrates such as octopuses, (Tye, 2017), to
many invertebrates, especially insects & crustacea (Barron and Klein, 2016; Bronfman et al.,
2016), and even to all living things, including plants and bacteria (Margulis, 2001; Reber et al.,
2022).
Crump et al. (2022) have now applied a set of eight criteria to decapod crustacea as a
way of deciding which of them are sentient. The authors start by acknowledging the difficulty
of this task but then go on to argue that, for ethical reasons, it may be necessary to take action
to protect animals based on evidence that is less than certain (Birch, 2017). Their proposed
framework, however, gives the impression that it can provide much stronger evidence for
animal sentience than it in fact does. Given the weight already given to their criteria in the
UK’s recent Animal Welfare (Sentience) Act 2022, it is important that the limitations of the
framework are acknowledged and discussed. Three of these are listed here.
1. Much complex behaviour occurs without sentience
Crump et al. state “We accept that any set of behavioural, cognitive, and neuroscientific
patterns could conceivably be achieved without sentience” (p.3). But the phrase “could
conceivably” appears to dismiss a growing volume of evidence that many highly complex
processes not only could, but actually do, occur without sentience.
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For example, people who take certain so-called fear-reducing drugs can appear calmer
on the outside and even show a reduction in heart rate and other physiological indicators of
fear but they say they still feel just as anxious and fearful as ever (LeDoux, 2014; LeDoux and
Hofmann, 2018). The drugs target the amygdala, which controls the behavioural and
physiological response to threat, whereas conscious feelings of fear arise from a different
brain circuit, one that does not require the amygdala (Anderson and Phelps, 2002), and are
unaffected by the medication (LeDoux and Pine, 2016; LeDoux and Hofmann, 2018). These
changes in behaviour/physiology clearly occur without a corresponding change in sentience.
Many behaviours and cognitive tasks such as playing a musical instrument or driving
a car also have multiple routes to action (Rolls, 2016) - that is, they can be performed using
alternative brain circuits, only some of which involve consciousness. Our brains enable us to
recognize faces, recognize emotions, detect errors, learn the rules of a game, read, and even
do mathematics, all without being conscious that we doing it, or how (Colman et al., 2010;
Dehaene, 2014; Axelrod, et al., 2015; Schelonka et al., 2017). “Most of the brain’s operations
are unconscious” Dehaene (2014) concludes “We are unaware of most of what we do and
know” (p.191).
These findings on human consciousness should make us careful when evaluating the
question of sentience in other species. They show that, even in humans, behaviour and
cognitive abilities are not necessarily tied to conscious experiences in any simple way. The
argument that other species are like us in their behaviour and so, by analogy, must be like us
in being sentient when they perform similar behaviour is therefore weaker than it might
appear. There is always the possibility that many animals could still be like us, but like us when
we are in unconscious mode. This means that until we understand a great deal more about
what a brain does when it gives rise to sentience, claims about sentience in invertebrates
should emphasize how little we currently understand about what makes the difference
between a sentient and a non-sentient brain.
2. All eight criteria can be met by simple machines
Crump et al. (2022) point out that the neural structures associated with sentience in humans
may be very different from those potentially present in invertebrates because the same
functions may be carried out by very different structures. However, the same functional
argument would also lead logically to the conclusion that it is not even necessary to have a
nervous system at all to be sentient and that a man-made machine could also be sentient,
provided that it can perform the relevant functions.
To see how easy it would be for even a relatively simple machine to meet all eight
criteria defined in functional terms, imagine an autonomous robot designed to operate for
long periods in a complex environment (such as another planet), where any guidance from
humans was limited or subject to significant time delays. To keep going for any length of time,
an efficient robot would have to have ways of detecting damage to itself (criterion 1) and of
integrating information to determine the source of damage (2 & 3). It would then need to be
able to repair itself and/or modify what it could do in the light of damage (4 & 6). It would
also need to have a mechanism for managing motivational trade-offs (5) such as deciding
priorities for different tasks, repairing, itself or dropping everything to go and recharge its
batteries. The advantages of anticipating or avoiding damage altogether could be gained by
using already advanced techniques of machine learning (7); and since the robot would also
need to have a mechanism for knowing whether the steps it was taking to avoid, alleviate or
repair damage to itself were working, it might also show the equivalent of our response to
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analgesics and anaesthetics (8). We judge whether our injured limb is healing by whether the
pain signal is getting less and find anything that reduces that signal rewarding, even when the
pain signal has been artificially reduced by a pain-killer. Similarly, a machine that used
progressive reduction in a damage signal as evidence that its repair of surface damage was
working could also be more likely to seek out situations that reduced the damage signal. The
point is that all eight criteria proposed by Crump et al. could easily be met (and in many cases
are already met) by machines programmed with simple algorithms.
Accepting the eight criteria as evidence for sentience in crustacea and other
invertebrates would thus allow a whole army of damage-detecting, self-repairing, selftraining machines into the sentience club. I am not arguing here either for or against sentience
in machines. I am simply pointing out that the Crump et al., criteria for sentience in crustacea
could make it difficult to say that some quite simple machines were not also sentient.
3. The grading system confuses meeting a ‘sentience criterion’ with whether that criterion
correctly indicates sentience
Crump et al. propose a grading system for judging the overall strength of evidence that
crustacea (and other animals) are sentient that looks at first sight as though it does provide
the necessary provisos and disclaimers. On page 8, a grade of “very high confidence” is
defined as “when the weight of scientific evidence leaves no scope for reasonable doubt” that
an animal satisfies or fails one of their criteria for sentience. However, on page 9, high or very
high confidence is stated to be when there is very strong evidence for sentience itself, with
“No urgent need for further research into sentience in this taxon.” Very high confidence that
an animal fulfils most of their criteria for sentience has been subtly transformed into very high
confidence that their sentience criteria do actually detect sentience. This could mislead the
unwary reader (or legislator) into believing that the scientific evidence for sentience in some
crustacea is so strong as not to require more research. But evidence that a ‘sentience
criterion’ has been met is not evidence that the criterion correctly indicates sentience. As
argued above, the criteria themselves are highly uncertain indicators of sentience so even
100% compliance with all of them would not guarantee certainty of sentience.
4. Conclusions.
If less than certain evidence is, on ethical grounds, used to decide which animals are sentient
as Crump et al. recommend, then it is important that the weaknesses and objections to that
evidence are stated explicitly, for two reasons: First, it is important as guidance for legislators
so that they can evaluate explicitly the possible risks and side-effects such as failing to protect
the welfare of a genuinely sentient animal versus needlessly legislating to protect the welfare
of an insentient organism or machine.
Second, it is important on scientific grounds. Sentience – in any brain, human or
otherwise – remains one of the biggest unsolved puzzles in the whole of biology. We should
not give up saying so just because legislators have decided that there is enough evidence to
pass laws and regulations (Dawkins et al., 2022). Highly complex behaviour can and does
occur without sentience. The fallibility of the neural, behavioral and cognitive evidence we
currently have needs to be spelled out so that everyone can see just how much we still do not
know about which animals – or machines - are sentient.
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